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HON. LEWIS F. POWELL, JR.: FIVE YEARS ON
THE SUPREME COURT
MR. JUSTICE POWELL: AN OVERVIEW
J. Harvie Wilkinson III*
In January of 1977, Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., marked his fifth
anniversary as an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the
United States. Any definitive evaluation of Justice Powell at this
hopefully still early stage of his judicial service is impossible. Yet
the 1975 term of Court-Powell's fifth-marked him as a Justice of
great collegial impact and, in terms of his own career, saw a coming
of age: an end, if you will, to the beginning.
As with Justice Black during the Warren years, Justice Powell in
the 1975 term saw the full Court adopt several of his important
positions and viewpoints of earlier years. The judgment of the Court
in the capital punishment cases,' of which Powell was triauthor,
borrowed significantly from his earlier Furman v. Georgia dissent.2
Powell's Court opinion in Stone v. Powell,3 which greatly restricted
federal habeas corpus review of state prisoners' fourth amendment
claims, was a direct outgrowth of his previous concurrence in
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte.1 His effort in the elaborate separate
opinion in Keyes v. Denver School District5 to limit the equitable
discretion of federal district court judges in pupil assignment plans
bore modest fruit in Pasadena Board of Education v. Spangler.6 And
two of Powell's major dissents of the 1974 term, which rejected
extensions of due process requirements and section 1983 liability'
to the actions of school officials, may have helped generate majority
opinions authored by Powell which significantly limited those two
* B.A., Yale University, 1967; J.D., University of Virginia, 1972. Law Clerk to Mr. Justice
Lewis F. Powell, Jr., 1971 and 1972 terms. Associate Professor of Law, University of Virginia.
1. Gregg v. Georgia, 96 S. Ct. 2909 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 96 S. Ct. 2960 (1976); Jurek
v. Texas, 96 S. Ct. 2950 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 96 S. Ct. 2978 (1976); Roberts v.
Louisiana, 96 S. Ct. 3001 (1976).
2. 408 U.S. 238, 414 (1972).
3. 96 S. Ct. 3037 (1976).
4. 412 U.S. 218, 250 (1973).
5. 413 U.S. 189, 217 (1973) (concurring in part, dissenting in part).
6. 96 S. Ct. 416 (1976). The Court's opinion in Spangler was by Justice Rehnquist.
7. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 584 (1975).
8. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 327 (1975) (concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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doctrines just one term later,9 though admittedly outside the school
context.
From the outset, commentators have seen in Justice Powell a
jurist of special promise,10 and some newsmen recently have termed
him the "dominant" figure on the Burger Court." Such claims,
though titillating to debate, are impossible and perhaps not really
important to resolve. What seems certain is that historians of the
Burger Court and of the Court's course in the twentieth century will
find him worth prolonged attention.
One begins with Justice Powell as the Burkean judge. The Bur-
kean or Whig model, wrote Alexander Bickel,
begins not with theoretical rights but with a real society, whose ori-
gins in the historical mists it acknowledges to be mysterious. The
Whig model assesses human nature as it is seen to be. . . . The
values of such a society evolve, but as of any particular moment they
are taken as given. Limits are set by culture, by time-and place-
bound conditions, and within these limits the task of government
informed by the present state of values is to make a peaceable, good,
and improving society. That, and not anything that existed prior to
society itself and that now exists independently of society, is what
men have a right to. The Whig model is flexible, pragmatic, slow
moving, highly political. . . . [It] rests on a mature skepticism.2
Unlike many activists of the Lochner and Warren eras, Justice
Powell remains mainly pragmatic, cautious, understated, tradition-
alist, mildly fatalistic, more at home with the ironies of human
nature and the shades and tangles of individual human situations
than with the lofty imperatives of grand and abstract constitutional
rights. "Logic," he recently observed, ". . . would seem to dictate
that arrests be subject to the warrant requirement at least to the
9. Mathews v. Eldridge, 96 S. Ct. 893 (1976); Imbler v. Pachtman, 96 S. Ct. 984 (1976).
10. See Howard, Mr. Justice Powell and the Emerging Nixon Majority, 70 MICH. L. REV.
445 (1972); Gunther, In Search of Judicial Quality on a Changing Court: The Case of Justice
Powell, 24 STAN. L. REv. 1001 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Gunther].
11. See, e.g., Denniston, Where the Justices Stand at the End of a Tough Term, Washing-
ton Star, July 8, 1976 § A, at 1, col. 1; Kohlmeier, Justice Powell: For Business, a Friend in
Court, New York Times, March 14, 1976, § 3, at 5, cols. 1-3.
12. A. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 4 (1975).
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same extent as searches. But logic sometimes must defer to history
and experience." '' 3
Justice Powell is a believer in the limitations of human institu-
tions in the face of human nature. Man, he suspects, is likely to
outwit or outlast most concerted attempts to "improve" him. Thus
the federal judiciary, our most remote and elite organ of govern-
ment, must become more realistic, less ambitious. From the first,
Powell has been concerned about the workload of the Supreme
Court," not as a matter of personal pressure, but as an unrealistic
matching of judicial aims to capabilities. He has often sought, in the
name of federalism, to turn responsibility for decisions over to the
states. 5 He has limited the access to federal court of litigants press-
ing social reform."6 He has also regarded with some suspicion the
equitable powers of the federal district court judge, 7 which, in their
breadth and discretion, have aroused in some Americans significant
hostility and resentment.
Justice Powell has evinced a greater willingness to credit the judg-
ment of lower level public functionaries, though his trust in them
is by no means naive or absolute." Prosecutors should, in general,
enjoy great latitude in initiating prosecution,' 9 police 0 and grand
juries' in uncovering evidence, state trial judges in conducting voir
dire, 2 welfare workers in removing recipients from the rolls,2 school
13. United States v. Watson, 96 S. Ct. 820, 830 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring).
14. See An Overburdened Supreme Court, Address to the Fourth Circuit Judicial Confer-
ence, June 30, 1972, pp. 11-12.
15. See, e.g., Stone v. Powell, 96 S. Ct. 3037 (1976); New York Dept. of Social Serv. v.
Dublino, 413 U.S. 405 (1973); San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1
(1973); Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 366 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring).
16. See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S.
166, 180 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring).
17. Keyes v. Denver School Dist., 413 U.S. 189, 217 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part). Note also Powell's "join" of Justice Rehnquist's Court opinions in
Rizzo v. Goode, 96 S. Ct. 598 (1976) and Pasadena Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 96 S. Ct. 416
(1976).
18. See, e.g., Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974); Almeida-Sanchez v. United
States, 413 U.S. 266, 275 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring).
19. Imbler v. Pachtman, 96 S. Ct. 984 (1976).
20. Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972).
21. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
22. Ristaino v. Ross, 96 S. Ct. 1017 (1976).
23. Mathews v. Eldridge, 96 S. Ct. 893 (1976).
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officials in enforcing discipline among their charges,4 military offi-
cers in directing basic training,2 and so on. The Warren Court, of
course, took quite the opposite tack, believing that bright-line con-
stitutional rules would help reform the insensitive, even brutal,
treatment by police and petty bureaucrats toward those with whom
they dealt.26 To Powell, however, the law seems distinctly less likely
to reform the behavior of such persons than to impede solutions of
the very severe problems they confront. Those problems, for the
most part, involve front-line maintenance of discipline and order.
For Justice Powell, it is precisely the breakdown of such things as
community order and individual self-discipline that most endanger
the nation's health. "One who does not comprehend the meaning
and necessity of discipline," he noted, "is handicapped not merely
in his education but throughout his subsequent life."
Justice Powell's generally modest conception of the judicial reach
influences his technique of opinion-writing, which often seeks to
balance competing factors en route to narrow, fact-specific results.
Consider, for example, the classic Powellian per curiam, Spence v.
Washington,8 which involved the right of a protester in the wake of
the Cambodian-Kent State crisis to display a flag, to which was
affixed a peace symbol, from the window of his apartment. Powell
eventually upheld the protester's right, but only after painstakingly
pointing out all that the case did not involve:
First, this was a privately owned flag. In a technical property sense
it was not the property of any government. . . .Second, appellant
displayed his flag on private property. He engaged in no trespass or
disorderly conduct. Nor is this a case that might be analyzed in terms
of reasonable time, place, or manner restraints on access to a public
area. Third, the record is devoid of proof of any risk of breach of the
peace ...
24. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 584 (1975) (Powell, J., dissenting).
25. Greer v. Spock, 96 S. Ct. 1211, 1219 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring).
26. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
27. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 593 (1975) (Powell, J., dissenting).
28. 418 U.S. 405 (1974). Although one can never be entirely certain which Justice authored
a per curiam, Powell had written a Court opinion just three months earlier in Smith v.
Goguen, 415 U.S. 566 (1974), reversing a Massachusetts conviction of Goguen for wearing a
small United States flag sewn to the seat of his trousers. Then, too, the careful interest
balancing in Spence is characteristic of Justice Powell's approach to first amendment issues.
See generally Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972), and Gunther, supra note 10.
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It may be noted, further, that this was not an act of mindless
nihilism....
• . . [T]here was no risk that appellant's acts would mislead viewers
into assuming that the Government endorsed his viewpoint. To the
contrary, he was plainly and peacefully protesting the fact that it did
not. Appellant was not charged under the desecration statute...
nor did he permanently disfigure the flag or destroy it. .... 11
The opinion thus ultimately came to rest on the head of a pin.
Yet, ironically, Spence did propound a significant principle-that
conduct, as well as speech, was to be subject to rigorous first amend-
ment balancing. But the principle emerged almost in spite of itself,
only after the exhaustive efforts at reducing it could proceed no
further.
Spence stands in obvious contrast to the more sweeping approach
of San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,0 where
Powell sought to establish two-tiered scrutiny as the dominant
mode of equal protection analysis. Powell saw in Rodriguez and in
the two-tiered test an opportunity to shield all but the most select
and specifically enumerated subjects from close judicial review. The
opinion was grandly conceived and grandly executed to contain an
equal protection law that, only one term before, had shown definite
signs of slipping out of control. 31
From the beginning, however, there were difficulties. Justice Pow-
ell's early opinion in Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.,32 was
among those that appeared to advocate a balancing framework for
equal protection claims that was in essence a third, intermediate
standard of scrutiny, or at least a heightened version of the tradi-
tionally supine rational basis test. 3 Moreover, this middle-level
29. 418 U.S. at 408-10, 414-15 (emphasis added).
30. 411 U.S. 1 (1973). The Court in Rodriguez rejected a constitutional challenge to dispari-
ties in funding among public school districts in Texas.
31. See especially James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128 (1972); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.,
406 U.S. 164 (1972); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S.
438 (1972); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), and
the thoughtful discussion of these and others of that term's equal protection cases in Gunther,
The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing
Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1972).
32. 406 U.S. 164 (1972).
33. See also James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128 (1972).
1977]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 11:259
scrutiny has survived Rodriguez, most noticeably in the sex discrim-
ination context. 4 Indeed Justice Powell's own concurrences in
Frontiero v. Richardson" and Cleveland Board of Education v.
LaFleur5 and his votes in such cases as Department of Agriculture
v. Moreno3 and Stanton v. Stanton3 1 - all after Rodriguez - can
best be understood as tacit acknowledgements that the middle stan-
dard continued to exist. Events came full circle last term in
Mathews v. Lucas"5 when Justice Powell joined Justice Blackmun's
Court opinion which directly quoted and utilized the Weber middle-
level balancing formula. 0
Fully as important as doctrinal developments are the qualities of
mind and temperament evidenced in the Powell opinions. While
some seem strained,4' bare 2 or insufficiently instructive,4 3 many
more appear products of sustaining quality." The opinions are, at
their best, precise in expression, sound in construction, candid as
34. See, e.g., Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975).
35. 411 U.S. 677, 691 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment).
36. 414 U.S. 632, 651 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring in the result). Although in this case
Justice Powell explicitly invoked a rationality standard, the maternity leave rules at issue
seemed at least rationally related to the state's goal of keeping physically unfit teachers from
the classroom. It is difficult to resist the conclusion, therefore, that Justice Powell implicitly
employed an intermediate level of scrutiny.
37. 413 U.S. 528 (1973), referred to as yet another example of an "unacknowledged applica-
tion of a stricter rationality test . The Supreme Court, 1972 Term, 87 HARV. L. REv.
55, 133 (1973).
38. 421 U.S. 7 (1975).
39. 96 S. Ct. 2755 (1976).
40. The results in Weber and Mathews were different; Mathews rejecting the constitutional
challenge and Weber affirming it.
41. Lloyd Corp., Ltd. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
42. United States v. Miller, 96 S. Ct. 1619 (1976); Ristaino v. Ross, 96 S. Ct. 1017 (1976).
43. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972).
44. Among the best, in my view, are Imbler v. Pachtman, 96 S. Ct. 984 (1976); Mathews
v. Eldridge, 96 S. Ct. 893 (1976); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975); Goss
v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 584 (1975) (Powell, J., dissenting); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S.
396 (1974); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974); In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717
(1973); Keyes v. Denver School Dist., 413 U.S. 189, 217 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 250 (1973) (Powell, J.,
concurring); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 414 (1972) (Powell, J., dissenting); Healy v.
James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972); United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972);
Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 366 (1972) (opinion of Powell, J.); and, collectively, the
border search quartet: United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 96 S. Ct. 3074 (1976); United States
v. Ortez, 422 U.S. 891 (1975); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975); Almeida-
Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 275 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring).
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to premise and progression, more cogent and forceful than eloquent
in argument. They are thorough, as distinct from compendious.
Their essential characteristic is often an appealing modesty. Justice
Powell does not over-work an argument,45 and he is willing to admit
quite openly the deficiencies of past performance." The modesty is
genuinely part of his broader outlook. Indeed, he poses the work of
the present Court in prosaic and, perhaps, unfairly diminished
terms:
Few would deny that the Warren Court, in a 15-year span, vastly
expanded the role of the judiciary by construing the Constitution in
dramatically bold and unprecedented ways....
It was perhaps inevitable, even without major changes in person-
nel, that a period of consolidation and leveling-off would follow.
Changes in personnel did bring, as they have in the past, fresh and
different assumptions and perceptions as to the role of the Court and
certain constitutional issues.
The present Court, mindful of preserving-the vitality of democratic
processes, may be more deferential to legislative judgments, it is
more likely to give some weight to federalism, and it is more conven-
tional in demanding compliance with jurisdictional and standing re-
quirements."
Justice Powell's stature on the present Court is attributable, as
much as anything else, to his independence. Independence on the
Supreme Court is more than a matter of a conscientious vote on the
merits of each case. It means, in the truest sense, a confident in-
tellectual distinctiveness of the kind Justices Black, Harlan and
Frankfurter have recently exhibited. Powell demonstrated a re-
markable willingness, as a new Justice, to chart his own course on
important questions in such areas as: school desegration,5 federal
habeas corpus,49 unanimous jury verdicts,"0 border searches,"1 sex
45. Note, for example, the discussion of the degree of hardship worked by an erroneous
termination in Mathews v. Eldridge, 96 S. Ct. 893, 906-07 (1976).
46. See especially Hudgens v. NLRB, 96 S. Ct. 1029, 1039 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring).
47. Report on the Court, Address to the Labor Law section of the American Bar Associa-
tion, August 11, 1976, p. 11.
48. Keyes v. Denver School Dist., 413 U.S. 189 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
49. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 250 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring).
50. Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 366 (1972) (opinion of Powell, J.).
51. Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 275 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring).
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discrimination 2 and abusive speech.53 Indeed, no one can read the
work of the important 1975 term without observing the large
number of Powell concurrences. "4 It is always easier, of course, for a
busy Justice simply to join the majority opinion if it at all approxi-
mates his own views. In fact, a concurrence may suggest some res-
tiveness with the way a colleague wrote the Court's opinion55 or
reduce a majority voice to that of a less authoritative plurality. 6
While these concurrences, predictably, are not all equally helpful,
the fact that they were written demonstrates determination to vote
and think independently upon each case.
Second, there is independence as to result. Justice Powell has not
been preoccupied with how an opinion would be "received." Instead
he has voted his convictions, conservative by philosophy though not
by reflex. Each term, in fact, has produced at least one significant
Court opinion by Justice Powell of a libertarian bent.57 Finally, it
was Justice Powell who greatly helped to make the term "Nixon
Court" a misnomer. He disagreed with President Nixon's opposition
to abortion 8 and with his support of public aid for parochial
schools. Long before United States v. Nixon,0 Justice Powell wrote
the opinion refusing the administration's request to wiretap the
phones of domestic threats to the national security without a prior
52. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 691 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring in the judg-
ment).
53. Rosenfeld v. New Jersey, 408 U.S. 901, 903 (1972) (Powell, J., dissenting); Lewis v. City
of New Orleans, 408 U.S. 913 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring in the result); Brown v. Okla-
homa, 408 U.S. 914 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring in the result). On Justice Powell's approach
to this question, see Gunther, supra note 10, at 1029-35.
54. The term concurrence is meant to embrace concurring opinions, opinions concurring
in the judgment and opinions concurring in the result. There were twenty-one such Powell
opinions in the 1975 term.
55. See, e.g., United States v. Watson, 96 S. Ct. 820, 828 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring).
56. See, e.g., Hampton v. United States, 96 S. Ct. 1642 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring in
the judgment).
57. See, e.g., Doyle v. Ohio, 96 S. Ct. 2240 (1976); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422
U.S. 205 (1975); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974); Chambers v. Mississippi, 410
U.S. 284 (1973); United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972).
58. Justice Powell was, of course, a member of the majority in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973).
59. Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973); Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S.
825 (1973).
60. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
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court order.' The opinion was an eloquent forewarning of the worst
of Watergate:
History abundantly documents the tendency of Government-
however benevolent or benign its motives-to view with suspicion
those who most fervently dispute its policies. Fourth Amendment
protections become the more necessary when the targets of official
surveillance may be those suspected of unorthodoxy in their political
beliefs. . . . The price of lawful public dissent must not be a
dread of subjection to an unchecked surveillance power. Nor must
the fear of unauthorized official eavesdropping deter vigorous citizen
dissent and discussion of Government action in private conversation.
For private dissent, no less than open public discourse, is essential
to our free society.62
It is impossible in a brief introduction either to explore or to
predict the full extent of Justice Powell's contribution as a Justice
of the Supreme Court. 3 One parting hope does seem worth noting.
It was crucial to the prospects of constitutional restraint that the
change in direction from the Warren years be led by persons of
stature, independence and intellectual substance. Justice Powell
has, thankfully, supplied those commodities. Because of Justice
Powell, and others like him, the present may yet come to be an era
with its own significant character and message, more than a biding
of time between the Court's activist periods.
61. United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972).
62. Id. at 314.
63. I have further discussed this contribution in SERVING JUSCE: A SUPREME COURT
CLERK's VIEW (1974).
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